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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

V.

:

BRIAN SWINK,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990501-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for
Attempted Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (1999) (Theft) & 76-4-101 (1999) (Attempt), in
the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable
Tyrone E. Medley, Judge, presiding.

Jurisdiction is conferred on

this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .
See Addendum A (judgment and conviction).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress
a confession ruade by Appellant without benefit of warnings set
forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), in violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Standard of Review: "In reviewing the trial court's denial
of defendant's motion to suppress the incriminating statements,
we examine the trial court's 'underlying factual findings for
clear error,1 and ''review the trial court's conclusions of law
based [on those findings] for correctness.''" State v. Yoder, 935
P.2d 534, 545 (Utah App. 1997) (quotations omitted).
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"When, [as

in the present case,] a trial court bases its 'ultimate
conclusions concerning . . . defendant's

Miranda rights ... upon

essentially undisputed facts . . .' its conclusions present
questions of law . . . review[ed] under a correction of error
standard."

State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah App.1993)

(quoting State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah App.1990),
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, 503 U.S.
914, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992)).
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Brian Swink's ("Swink") motion to suppress his
illegally obtained confession is preserved on the record for
appeal ("R.") at 23-26,70.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The following constitutional provision is determinative of
the issues on appeal:
Amendment V, United States Constitution:
No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings
and Disposition in the Court Below.
Swink was charged by information with one count of theft of
a vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-404.

R.6-7.

Swink moved to suppress statements that

formed the basis of the charge and which were taken from him
without benefit of warnings set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 3 84

2
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U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1976),
in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.

R. 23-26;70.

The trial court denied Swink's motion, finding that there
was neither custody nor an interrogation for purposes of Miranda.
R.39,-71 [3-5] .

Consequently, Swink entered a conditional guilty

plea to attempted theft, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (theft) & 76-4-101 (attempt). R.4143,71[6-14].

See Utah R. Crim. P. ll(i) (1999); State v. Sery,

758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988).

Swink appeals from the denial of

his motion to suppress his illegally obtained confession.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Appellant Swink was a participant in the Genesis Youth
Center ("Genesis").

Genesis is an unsecured facility that

provides a work program designed for youth offenders to work off
restitution, community service hours, and fines.

R.69[12].

Swink was originally sentenced to the Decker Lake Youth
Corrections facility ("Decker Lake"), but was transferred to
Genesis on a ninety-day trial placement basis in anticipation of
his parole from Decker Lake.

Id.

On January 5, 1999, Swink and another Genesis participant
ran away from the program.

R.69[15-17].

At approximately 5:00

p.m. on the same day, Swink called Decker Lake to turn himself
in.

R.69[18].

A Decker Lake employee contacted Officer Corbett

Ford ("Ford") of the Salt Lake City Police Department to retrieve
3
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Swink.

R.69[28].

Ford called Swink to obtain his address.

Id.

Ford told Swink that it would be one-and-one-half hours before he
could pick him up.

Id.

Swink waited for Ford until he arrived

to escort him back to Decker Lake.

R.69[33].

Ford returned Swink to Decker Lake by 7:00 p.m.
[18,29] .

R.69

Swink was stripped of his street clothes, placed in

Decker Lake issue clothing, searched for contraband, and placed
into state custody on the basis of a fugitive warrant that was
issued when he fled from Genesis.
hand-cuffed.

R.69[22].

R.69[21-22].

Swink was not

According to Chris Pacheco ("Pacheco"),

a counselor at Decker Lake and a youth corrections officer, Swink
was not at liberty to leave when he was returned to Decker Lake,
having been detained on the fugitive warrant.

R.69[21].

Pacheco

further testified that he detained Swink on the warrant by his
own authority as a youth corrections officer.

R.69[21].

Pacheco received Swink at Decker Lake and initiated an
intake interview.

R.69[12,20,21].

Pacheco testified at Swink's

preliminary hearing that the purpose of the intake interview was
to determine whether Swink was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol, and whether he was suicidal or otherwise in need of
medical attention.

R.69[13].

He also testified that the purpose

of the interview was to secure the safety of both Swink and
Decker Lake. Id.
To this end, Pacheco asked Swink where he had been and what
he had been up to while on the run.

R.69[14].

Initially, Swink

responded that he and one other person had run away from Genesis
4
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and ended up at South Towne Mall in the afternoon.

R.69[14].

Pacheco testified that Swink's story had gaps, leading Pacheco to
believe that Swink was lying and prompting him to press Swink for
more information.

R.69[15,24].

Pacheco testified that, upon questioning, Swink stated, "F
it, I'll probably get in trouble anyway."

R.69[15,24]. Swink

told how he and the second person, named Azar, went to a
convenience store and made a phone call.

R.69[16].

They were

picked up and taken to Azar's home, then to a grocery store where
Swink stole a screwdriver.

R.69[16].

Swink proceeded to Trolley

Square, then walked along 700 East until he came upon a Toyota
minivan.

Id.

He started the van by inserting the screwdriver

into the ignition.
the van.

Id.

Swink told Pacheco that he drove away in

R.69[16-17] .

Pacheco continued questioning Swink.
how he drove to South Towne Mall.
mall by mall security.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Swink described

Swink was chased from the

He got back into the van and left.

Id.

He abandoned the van and called Decker Lake to turn himself

in.

R.69 [18] .

Pacheco never administered Miranda warnings at

any point during his interview with Swink, testifying that he is
not required to administer such warnings.

R.69[25].

Officer Ford, who was present throughout Pacheco's interview
with Swink, testified that it became apparent that Swink was
involved in an auto theft.

R.69[33-34].

Ford also testified

that Swink was in custody and was not free to leave during the
questioning.

R.69[34].

However, Ford likewise failed to give
5
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Swink Miranda warnings.

Id.

At the end of the interview, Ford

asked Swink where the stolen van was located because Swink had
earlier indicated that the van was still running.

R.69[30].

Swink revealed the van's location and Ford accordingly called the
SLCPD.

R.69[31].

Ford verified that the van was stolen and

called for recovery.

Id.

returned it to it's owner.

The SLCPD recovered the van and
R.69[32].

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that
the undisputed facts presented at the preliminary hearing did not
amount to a custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda and,
consequently, in denying Swink's motion to suppress his nonMirandized statement obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT SWINK'S STATEMENT WAS ADMISSIBLE ALTHOUGH
IT WAS TAKEN AS THE RESULT OF A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
WITHOUT BENEFIT OF MIRANDA WARNINGS.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1976), the United States Supreme
Court held:
the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
6
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the privilege against self-incrimination. . . . As for
the procedural safeguards to be employed, . . . the
following measures are required. Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed. The defendant may waive the effectuation
of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Id. at 444.
"The warning mandated by Miranda was meant to preserve the
privilege [against compulsory self-incrimination] during
'incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere. '" Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296, 110 S.Ct.
2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445).
"That atmosphere is said to generate 'inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely.1"

Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).

In the present case, the trial court erred as a matter of
law in denying Swink's motion to suppress his statement because
the undisputed facts establish the "salient features" of a
custodial interrogation necessitating the Miranda warnings1: a
compelled confession, "incommunicado interrogation," and a

1

"When a trial court bases its 'ultimate conclusions
concerning . . . defendant's Miranda rights ... upon essentially
undisputed facts . . . ! its conclusions present questions of law
which we review under a correction of error standard." State v.
Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah App.1993) (quoting State v.
Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah App.1990), cert, denied, 817
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, 503 U.S. 914, 112 S.Ct. 1282,
117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992)).
7
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"police-dominated atmosphere."
A.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.

Custody

The trial court concluded that the facts of Swink's case did
not amount to "custody" for purposes of Miranda, 3 84 U.S. at 444.
R.71[3-4].

In so holding, the court adopted the "added

imposition" test, a test used by a number of jurisdictions to
determine whether an individual, already detained in a
correctional facility, is in "custody."

R.71[3]; see also

Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1978) (applying
added imposition test in prison context); Garcia v. Singletary,
13 F.3d 1487, 1491 (11th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v.
Conely, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985) (same), cert denied,
479 U.S. 830, 107 S.Ct. 114, 93 L.Ed.2d 61 (1986); Leviston v.
Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 488 U.S.
865, 109 S.Ct. 168, 102 L.Ed.2d 138 (1988); United States v.
Cooper, 800 F.2d 412, 414 (4th Cir. 1986) (same); United States
v. Willoucrhbv 860 F.2d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1988) (same), cert denied,
488 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 846, 102 L.Ed.2d 978 (1989); United
States v. Menzer 29 F.3d 1223, 1232-33 (7th Cir 1994) (same).
Without discussion of the facts, the court stated, "based upon
this court's determination of the facts and circumstances of this
case, this court is of the opinion that there . . . was no added
imposition imposed in this particular case warranting the
administration of the Miranda warnings."

R.71[3-4].

The court's

conclusion is in error.
The Miranda Court defined "custodial interrogation" as
8

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after

has been
of action

taken

into

custody

in any significant

or otherwise
way."

added) (footnote omitted).

deprived

of his

a

person

freedom

384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis

"'[A] court must examine all of the

circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but 'the ultimate
inquiry is simply whether there [was] a 'formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a
formal arrest.'"

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114

S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (quoting California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d
1275 (1983) (per curiam), quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam));
Swink was in "custody" under Miranda because he was under
arrest when questioned.

3 84 U.S. at 444.

Both Pacheco and

Officer Ford testified that Swink was in state custody when he
was interrogated at Decker Lake, having been arrested on the
fugitive warrant that issued when he absconded from Genesis.
R.69[21,34j.

Pacheco testified, moreover, that Swink was not

free to leave because of the warrant, and that he had the
authority as a youth corrections officer to detain Swink.
R.69[21] .

Hence, the trial court erred as a matter of law when

it concluded that Swink was not in custody; the uncontroverted
evidence establishes that Swink was under arrest and therefore
"ha[d] been taken into custody" for purposes of Miranda.
U.S. at 444; see also Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322.

9
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384

Yet, even if Pacheco and Ford had not testified that Swink
was in custody, R.69[21,34], the balance of the evidence would
still establish that Swink was "otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in [a] significant way," Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, and
that a reasonable person in his situation would not feel at
liberty to leave.

See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324.

In order to

determine "custody" in circumstances outside of formal arrest,
Utah courts have looked to four factors, including:

"'(1) the

site of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused
on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were
present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation.'" State v.
Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996) (quoting Salt Lake City
v. Carner. 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983)); see also State v.
Worthinqton, 970 P.2d 714, 715-16 (Utah App. 1998) (noting that
the U.S. Supreme Court in Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 321, set forth
the same factors and determined that no single factor was
"dispositive")2.

"' [T]he only relevant inquiry is how a

reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood

2

The trial court did not apply this test in its custody
analysis, using instead a test to determine custody in the prison
context.
See infra.
Discussion of the Mirquet factors is
nonetheless appropriate on appeal because the record evidence
concerning the content of the interview and the attendant
circumstances is both ample and undisputed. See Mirquet, 914 P. 2d
at 1147, 1149; State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 355 n.4 (Utah App.
1993) . "When credibility is not an issue as to underlying facts or
a trial judge has already made necessary credibility assessments,
the material facts are not disputed, and there is no additional
evidence relevant to the dispositive issues that can or should be
adduced, an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial
court to apply the governing rules of law to the facts." Id. at
1149; see also Snyder, 860 P.2d at 355 n.4.
10
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his situation.'" Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324 (quoting Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d 317
(1984)) .
The record establishes that Swink was in custody under these
factors.

As to the first and third Mirquet factors (the "site of

the interrogation" and the presence of "objective indicia of
arrest"), 914 P.2d at 1147, the record shows that the questioning
of Swink occurred at the Decker Lake youth detention center,
R.69[12,29], an inherently "police-dominated atmosphere."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.3

As noted by this Court in State v.

Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1990), " [s]tation-house
questioning lends itself to a finding of custody."

Id. at 1105

(citing Oregon v. Matthiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50
L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam)) (holding defendant in "custody"
where questioning occurred at police station); see State v.
Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 82 (Utah App. 1998) (defendant not in
"custody" where questioning occurred in school office);
Worthington, 970 P.2d at 716 (defendant not in "custody" who was
questioned in his home).
In addition, the questioning was conducted by Pacheco, a
counselor and a youth corrections officer, R.69[10,21], as well
as Officer Ford, a police officer and special functions agent for
the Division of Youth Corrections.

R.69[26-27,29].

Such a

police/authority presence underscores the custodial nature of
3

The record is silent as to where the interview occurred
inside Decker Lake, i.e. in an office, interrogation room, hallway,
or in an otherwise isolated or secured area.
11
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Swink's situation, and presents the sort of psychological
pressures that undermine an individual's right against selfincrimination.

See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297, 110

S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) ("[q]uestioning by captors,
who appear to control the suspect's fate, may create mutually
reinforcing pressures that the Court has assumed will weaken the
suspect's will"); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 (noting the
psychological pressures that "in-custody interrogation" brings to
bear upon suspects).
Moreover, Swink was escorted to Decker Lake by a police
officer.

R.69[27]; see State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 356 (Utah

App. 1993) (finding "custody" where defendant was driven to
"government facility" in police squad car and "site [of
questioning] was unilaterally chosen by the officers").

Prior to

that, Swink had been free, and was even left under his own
recognizance for an hour and a half until Ford picked him up.
R.69[33].

At Decker Lake, Swink was stripped of his street

clothing, put into a Decker Lake uniform, and searched for
contraband. R.69[22].
free to leave.

At no point was Swink informed that he was

R.69 [10-34]; see Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1105

("it

is pertinent to note that [defendant] was not specifically
informed of his freedom to leave") (footnote omitted).

Such

"objective indicia of arrest," Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147, would
lead the reasonable person in Swink's position to believe that he
was in custody.

See Stansburv, 511 U.S. at 324.

The second and fourth Mirquet factors ("whether the
12
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investigation focused on the accused" and the "length and form of
the interrogation") also compel the conclusion that Swink was in
"custody."

914 P.2d at 1147; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.

First, the interview was lengthy, lasting forty-five minutes.
See Brandley, 972 P.2d at 82 (questioning was non-custodial
because it lasted only ten or fifteen minutes); State v. Mincy,
838 P.2d 648, 653 (Utah App. 1992) (questioning non-custodial
because it lasted only five minutes).
As to the content of the interview,4 Pacheco testified that
the questioning was intended as an "intake interview" to
determine where Swink had been; whether he was under the
influence of drugs or alcohol; whether he needed medical
attention; whether he was suicidal; and to secure the safety of
Decker Lake and Swink.

R.69[12-14].

Pacheco did not testify that he asked any questions directly
relating to drugs or alcohol.

R.69[10-25].

Instead, Pacheco

asked general, open-ended questions about Swink's activity.
Pacheco started out by asking "where have you been? What have you
been doing?"

R.69[14].

Swink responded that he and another

Genesis participant ran away from the program.

Id.

Pacheco

asked him a few more times for his story, and each time Swink
would give Pacheco more details.

Id.

Pacheco testified that

Swink's story still had "inconsistencies and holes [and] didn't
make sense."

R.69[15],

He told Swink, "Brian, there's holes in

4

There was no transcript of the interview available to the
court below.
13
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the story.
Id.

You know, fill me in more of what's been going on."

At that point, Pacheco testified that Swink "hesita[ted]"

then,
finally said, yeah. He said F it. He said, I'm going
to get in trouble anyway, and so he then -- I said, I
want to know the story from the time you left Genesis
to the time you were picked up, and [Swink] started
from that point.
Id.

After this exchange, Swink told Pacheco that he stole a

screwdriver from a grocery store.

R.69[16].

Pacheco then

testified that Swink admitted he used the screwdriver to start,
and then steal, a minivan.

R.69[16-17].

Still unsatisfied with the story, Pacheco pressed further
with the questions "to determine where [Swink] had been."
R.69[17] .

Swink clarified that he drove the van to South Towne

mall, where he was chased by a security guard because he had
"taken something."

R.69[17-18].

Swink then told Pacheco that he

drove away in the van and later "dropped it off."
Pacheco asked Swink whether he "hot-wired" the van.
Swink "said no. . . . 1 started it and left."

R.69 [18-19] .
R.69[17].

Id.

Although characterized as an "intake interview" to determine
whether Swink was under the influence of drugs or alcohol,
R.69[12-13], Pacheco's open-ended and persistent questioning
style elicited obviously incriminating information from Swink.
Rather than asking direct questions about drug and alcohol use,
Pacheco asked Swink, "where have you been? What have you been
doing?"

R.69[14].

Moreover, Pacheco expressly told Swink that

he did not believe him because there were "holes in [his] story,"
14
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R.69[15], changing the complexion of the interview from one of
merely information gathering to an accusatorial questioning.

See

Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1105 (accusatorial questioning "weighs
heavily in favor of a determination of custody"); Brandley, 972
P.2d at 82 n.5 (holding questioning accusatory in part because
officer told defendant that witnesses accused him of lewdness and
his file contained incriminating information).

A reasonable

person under these circumstances would feel that he was the
"focus of [an] investigation."

Id. at 82.

Indeed, Swink, at

this point, responded to Pacheco's line of questioning with, "F
it. . . . I'm going to get in trouble anyway" and then proceeded
to admit that he stole the minivan.

R.69[15].

The accusatory nature of the questioning is further
underscored by the fact that it persisted long after Swink
clearly admitted to numerous instances of criminal conduct,
including absconding from the Genesis program, stealing a
screwdriver from a grocery store, stealing the minivan and taking
"something" from South Towne Mall.

R.69[16-18].

"'The change

from investigatory to accusatory questioning occurs when the
'police have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed and also reasonable grounds to believe that defendant
committed it.''" Snyder, 860 P.2d at 357 (quoting Sampson, 808
P.2d at 1105-06; quoting Carner, 664 P.2d at 1171) .
Indeed, both Pacheco and Ford testified that they understood
that Swink had stolen a car.

R.69[17,29-30,33-34].

conducted questioning in light of that realization.
15
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Both men
Pacheco

asked Swink how he started the van and whether he "hot-wired" it.
R.69[16-17].

Ford testified that he asked for the van's location

once Swink "mentioned . . . that he'd taken a vehicle from
downtown and had left it running."

R.69[29,33-34].

This Court in Snyder addressed a similar situation, wherein
the police discovered during the course of a non-accusatorial
interview that the defendant was the man responsible for the
crime under investigation.

860 P.2d at 357.

This Court stated:

[e]ven assuming that the initial questioning in this
case was merely investigatory, the questioning became
inarguably accusatory when defendant admitted that he
was the man involved in the incident and that he had
been masturbating immediately prior to the allegedly
lewd display.
Id.

Pacheco and Ford's questioning likewise "became inarguably

accusatory" when Swink admitted to stealing the van, as well as
when he admitted to absconding from the Genesis program, stealing
the screwdriver, and taking "something-[else]" from South Towne
Mall.

Id.; R.69[16-19].

Hence, the questioning was custodial in

nature, compelling the conclusion that Miranda warning were
necessary in this case.

See Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1105.

As noted supra, rather than the Mirquet analysis, the trial
court adopted the "added imposition" test, R.71[3], an analysis
used in other jurisdictions to determine "custody" in situations
where the individual is already incarcerated at the time of the
interrogation.

See Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 427; Garcia, 13 F.3d

at 1491; Conelv, 779 F.2d at 973; Leviston, 843 F.2d at 303;
Cooper, 800 F.2d at 414; Willoughby 860 F.2d at 23; Menzer 29
F.3d at 1232-33.
16
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The trial court's application of this test assumes that
Swink was incarcerated prior to the custodial interrogation.

As

noted by defense counsel below, R.70[12], the evidence actually
suggests that Swink was not incarcerated prior to being taken
into custody to the extent that he had absconded from the Genesis
program and was not under any supervision in the several hours
prior to the time when he turned himself in.

R.69 [15-18] .

Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that Swink was
incarcerated prior to the interview, the circumstances of this
case still amount to "custody" under the "added imposition" test.
In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d
381 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court held that prisoners subjected
to custodial interrogations were protected by the Fifth Amendment
and, therefore, entitled to Miranda warnings.

Id. at 4-5

(citing

Miranda, 3 84 U.S. at 4 78) (reversing and remanding conviction for
filing false tax returns based on statements taken from prisoner
defendant by IRS agent without Miranda warnings).

The Supreme

Court has not defined "custody" in the prison setting however.
See Bradley v. Ohio, 497 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 3258, 111 L.Ed.2d
768 (1990) (denying certiorari review on issue of "custody" in
prison setting for purposes of Miranda). 5
Other jurisdictions have developed the "added imposition"
test to determine custody in the prison context.

The Ninth

Utah case law likewise does not address "custody" in the
prison context for purposes of Miranda and therefore has not
specifically set forth the "added imposition" test adopted by the
lower court in this case.
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Circuit Court of Appeals was among the first to articulate the
test in Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428.

That Court stated,

The concept of "restriction" is significant in the
prison setting, for it implies the need for a showing
that the officers have in some way acted upon the
defendant so as to have "deprived (him) of his freedom
of action in any significant way," Miranda v. Arizona.
[] 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (footnote
omitted). In the prison situation, this necessarily
implies a change in the surroundings of the prisoner
which results in an added imposition on his freedom of
movement. Thus, restriction is a relative concept, one
not determined exclusively by lack of freedom to leave.
Rather, we look to some act which places further
limitations on the prisoner.
In defining this concept we adhere to the objective,
reasonable person standard.
Id.; see also Garcia, 13 F.3d at 1491; Conely, 779 F.2d at 973;
Leviston, 843 F.2d at 303; Cooper, 800 F.2d at 414; Willoucrhby
860 F.2d at 23; Menzer 29 F.3d at 1232-33.
In applying this test, courts have looked at various
factors, including the language used to summon the individual;
the physical surroundings; the extent to which the individual is
confronted with evidence of his guilt; additional pressure used
to detain him; whether he was incarcerated prior to questioning;
whether he initiated questioning; whether he was informed that he
was free to leave or to not answer questions; whether he was
under arrest; whether he had unrestrained freedom of movement
during questioning; and whether he was placed under arrest at the
termination of questioning.

See Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428;

United States v. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d 499, 503 (8th Cir. 1998)
(citing Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297); United States v. Griffin, 922
F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990)).

As noted in Chamberlain, the
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"custody issue ultimately 'focuses upon the totality of the
circumstances.'" 163 F.3d at 503 (quotation omitted).
Accordingly, the aforementioned factors need not all be present
to find "custody," nor is the list exhaustive.

Id. (citation

omitted).
In light of the foregoing, Swink was in "custody" under the
added imposition test employed by the trial court.

R.71[3].

In

addition to the factors discussed supra, which establish that
Swink underwent an "added imposition on his freedom of movement,"
Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428, it is significant that Swink was
originally housed at Genesis.

R.69[15].

Pacheco described

Genesis as an unsecured facility and work program in which
participants go out in to the community under the supervision of
Genesis staff.

R.69[12].

Decker Lake, by contrast, is a more

secured facility where the inmates have less freedom of
movement.6

See Chamberlain, 163 F.3d at 501-02, 504 (prisoner

defendant in "custody" because he was moved to a "higher-level
security facility" when questioned).
Accordingly, Swink's placement in Decker Lake, where he was
put in Decker Lake issue clothing and searched for contraband,
under arrest on the fugitive warrant, under the supervision of
Pacheco, a Decker Lake youth corrections officer, and Officer

6

Although the record does not provide information as to the
level of security at Decker Lake, it can be inferred from the facts
presented that it is a more secured facility than Genesis to the
extent that Decker Lake inmates are transferred to Genesis when
they are placed on parole. R.69[12] .
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Ford, represents an "added imposition on [Swink's] freedom of
movement."

Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428; R.69[10-12,21-22].

A

reasonable inmate in Swink's position would not feel at liberty
to do anything other than answer the questions asked of him by
the authorities present.

See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324;

Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428.
In sum, Swink was in "custody" for purposes of Miranda, 3 84
U.S. at 444.

He was under arrest on the fugitive warrant when

questioned by Pacheco and Ford.

Moreover, under the factors set

forth in Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147, as well as the "added
imposition" test adopted by the trial court, Swink was under
restraint amounting to formal arrest.

A reasonable person in his

situation would not feel at liberty to leave or do anything other
than answer the questions asked by Pacheco and Ford.

The trial

court erred, therefore, in concluding that Swink's circumstances
did not amount to "custody" for purposes of Miranda, 3 84 U.S. at
444; R.71[3].
B.

Interrogation.

The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that
the uncontroverted evidence established that Swink was not
"interrogated" for purposes of Miranda.

3 84 U.S. at 444.

The

court noted the following in this regard:
Furthermore, in this court's view, this court is of the
opinion that the counselor, and there was a counselor
involved in this discussion with Mr. Swink, consistent
with his testimony in this court's view, first of all,
. . . he didn't have prior knowledge of the specific
criminal activity when he had this conversation with
Mr. Swink. He also testified, in this court's view,
and it seems to be reasonable and consistent that his
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primary purpose was that of the safety of Mr. Swink,
the safety of other individuals in the facility and the
facility itself. That in essence, this was an intake
interview. It lasted approximately 45 minutes in
duration. Based upon the conversation, it appears that
there was no coercion or compulsion of any nature in
this court's view in any way. And for all those
reasons, . . . this court•does not believe that the
facts and circumstances necessitated the admonition,
the Miranda admonition.
R.71[4] .
Miranda proscribes "questioning

initiated by law enforcement

officers" that occurs when an individual is in "custody."
U.S. at 444 (emphasis added). 7

3 84

The U.S. Supreme Court in Rhode

Island v. Innis. 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297
(1980), expanded the definition of "interrogation" to include
"express questioning or its functional equivalent."

Id. at 300-

01.
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but
also to any words or actions on the part of the police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.
Id. at 301 (footnotes omitted).

" [T]he definition of

interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of

7

Under Miranda, "questioning" does not include

[g]eneral
on-the-scene
questioning
as
to
facts
surrounding a crime or other general questioning of
citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by
our holding. . . . In such situations the compelling
atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody
interrogation is not necessarily present.
Id. at 477-78 (footnote omitted).
Moreover, "[v]olunteered
statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment." Id.
at 478.
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police officers that they should

have

known

likely to elicit an incriminating response."
(emphasis original).

were reasonably
Id. at 302

"Although the question of whether a

statement or comment is reasonably likely to evoke an
incriminating answer is an inquiry resolved from the perspective
of the defendant, [] it must be resolved in light of the
officer's knowledge of the suspect's characteristics."

State v.

Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1311 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Innis, 446
U.S. at 301-03).
Implicit in the definition of "interrogation" is the
recognition that the "'interrogation environment' created by the
interplay of interrogation and custody would 'subjugate the
individual to the will of his examiner' and thereby undermine the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination."

Innis, 446

U.S. at 299 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58); see also
Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297 ("[i]t is the premise of Miranda that
the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody
and official interrogation").

"Questioning by captors, who

appear to control the suspect's fate, may create mutually
reinforcing pressures that the Court has assumed will weaken the
suspect's will."

Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297.8

8

The Miranda rule does not apply where there is no State
action. See Colorado v. Connelv, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) . Although not
disputed by the trial court or the State, it bears mentioning that
Pacheco and Officer Ford are both government agents for purposes of
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Pacheco testified that he is employed as
a counselor at the Decker Lake juvenile correctional facility and
is classified as a youth corrections officer with authority to
detain juvenile inmates. R.69[10,21]. Likewise, Ford testified
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In light of the foregoing, the questioning initiated by
Pacheco and participated in by Ford constitutes "interrogation"
under Miranda.

384 U.S. at 444.

The colloquies with Pacheco and

Ford establish the interrogatory nature of the questioning of
Swink.

Pacheco testified to the following on direct and cross-

examination regarding the interview:
State: [R.69[13]] Okay. You had this conversation [with
Swink.] What did you talk about initially?

Pacheco: Initially
I just asked Brian where he'd
you know, what he was doing.9
The point of my

been,

conversation was, A, to find out where Brian had been.
But not only that, but I needed to know his demeanor. I
also needed to know if he'd taken any drugs or alcohol.
. . . If there's need for medical attention and/or his
demeanor could be for suicide. . . .
State: Okay, so your conversation focused on what he
was doing, to find out if he was consuming any alcohol
[R.96[14]] or drugs for the safety of Decker Lake and
his own safety; is that right?
Pacheco: Correct.
State: Okay. So what happened after you had this
conversation? What did you talk about then?
Pacheco: The conversation was, you know, Brian,

have you been?

What have you been doing?

where

He started

out with, I ran from Genesis with a kid.
State: Does he say who?
Pacheco: At that point he did not say who. Through the
conversation, though, I did determine the individual's
name.

that he is a police officer and a special functions agent with the
Department of Youth Corrections. R.69[26-27].
9

The italicized portions of Pacheco and Ford's testimony
indicate general questioning of Swink as to his whereabouts and
activity and/or questioning as to the stolen car in particular.
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State: Okay. After he's telling you about how he fled
from Genesis, did you ask him any questions about what
was going on once he was on AWOL status?
Pacheco: I'd asked him where he'd been.
. . . At that
point he said he and the other kid had ran. They went
somewhere, and didn't specify where. From there he
ended up at South Towne Mall.
State: Did you question him about that?
Pacheco: I did. I asked him, you know, Where have you
been?
He said, The individual and I ran. We made a
phone call at Maverick. We talked to somebody - again,
not naming any names. He said he went up to Trolley
[R.69[15] Square Mall and then down to South Towne
Mall. So each time I had asked him, a little bit more
of the story had come out.
State: And his story is progressively changing.
does that mean to you?

What

Pacheco: Well, the inconsistencies and the holes, it
didn't make sense. The whole story was not there.
State: So what was your response to these holes and
inconsistencies (inaudible)?
Pacheco: Once again I said, Brian there's
holes in the
story.
You know, fill
me in more of what's been
going
on.
State: And did he?
Pacheco: At one point, he did. He was
he finally said, yeah. He said F it.
going to get in trouble anyway, and so
said, I want to know the story from the
Genesis
to the time you were picked
up,
from that
point.

hesitant. Then
He said, I'm
he then - I
time you
left
and he
started

State: And he freely gave you that information?
Pacheco: Correct. . . . He said that he and - the
other juvenile's name was Azar, [] ran from Genesis. .
. [R.69[16] [They] were picked up and taken to Azar's
home and from Azar's home they had gone to a Smith's. .
. . From Smith's, he said he stole a screwdriver and
was dropped off at Trolley Square Mall. . . .
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State: So he stole a screwdriver at Smith's and then
what did he tell you?
Pacheco: Said that he walked south on 7th East and he
found a vehicle.
State: What kind of vehicle, did he say?
Pacheco: At the time, he did not say.
He said
the
easiest
ones to steal,
and I said okay.
You know, I
named a few different
vehicle
brands.
He said no,
it
was a mini-van.
I says okay. He said that he jumped
in - he says all you have to do is push the screwdriver
into the ignition and it will start. He said he left
with the [R.69[17] minivan.
State: So Mr. Swink admits to you that he stole a minivan?
Pacheco: Correct.
State: What was your response to that?
Pacheco: To continue
with the story,
to determine
where
he had been.
. . . He said at that point that . . . he
ended up in South Towne Mall. . . . [H]e said that at
South Towne Mall he'd been chased by the security in
the mall and . . . he had stated that he'd jumped into
a van, started it and left. I'd asked him did he hotwire it. He said no. I said, Did you have the keys?
He said, No; I started it and left.
So that was kind of why I said there's
more to
this
story and that's
why I'd gone back to him and
said,
Let's
hear the whole
story.
State: Did he eventually tell you that whole story?
Pacheco: Yeah. . . . [R.69[18]] He said that he had
taken something - . . . it was never determined what
exactly - from [South Towne M]all. He did not say
which store. At which point he said, I jumped into the
van. He said, I was followed out by some undercover
security. . . . He said at that point he drove away. .
State: [R.69[19]] Did the Defendant, in reference to
this mini-van that he stole, did he ever indicate what
he did with that?
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Pacheco: He said he'd dropped it off. We asked
him
where.
He said it was about two blocks or a block away
from where [Officer Ford] picked him up. At that point
he said - he goes, In the pursuit when the security was
following me, the screwdriver fell out, he said, so he
just left it running and walked away.
At that point, [Officer Ford] tried to get a closer
location of where it was left so he could, A, determine
if it was still there and notify a police officer to
come and recover the vehicle. . . .
[Cross-Examination]
Defense Counsel: [R.69[21]] You said that one of the
purposes for this intake is to determine if he is
suicidal or needs medical attention because of the use
of drugs. Did you make [R.69[22]] that determination?
Pacheco: Through his demeanor and through his
conversation, at that point, no, I didn't see that it
was needed.
Ford, present throughout Pacheco's questioning of Swink,
likewise testified during direct examination that he questioned
Swink about the stolen vehicle.
Ford: I didn't really ask anything as far as details
what Brian had been involved in until he had mentioned
to Chris and I that he'd taken a vehicle from downtown
Salt Lake and that he had left it running.
State: So you were present and you overheard the
Defendant's admission that he stole a mini-van and that
he dumped it somewhere and left it running?
Ford: Yes, I was.
State: And what was your response once you overheard
that?
Ford: When I heard that, I was concerned that - because
he had stated that he left the vehicle running and the
doors unlocked and there was no key, I was concerned
that there could be some public safety issues . . . or
that the car may be stolen again, so I asked him to

describe to me the exact location of the vehicle
that I could go and secure the
vehicle.
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so

R.69 [29-30] .

Ford then testified that Swink gave him the

location of the stolen van; that he located the van at that
place; that he verified with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office that the van, in fact, had been reported stolen; and that
he notified the Salt Lake City Police Department to recover the
stolen van.

R.69[31].

Ford reiterated upon cross-examination

that it became apparent that Pacheco and Swink were talking about
a crime, and that he asked Swink specific information about a
vehicle that Swink indicated he stole.

R.69[33-34].

The trial court erred in concluding that Pacheco's "intake
interview" did not amount to "interrogation."

R.71[4].

In fact,

Pacheco's line of questioning amounts to "interrogation" because
Pacheco and Ford should have known that it was "reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response" from Swink.

Innis, 446 U.S.

at 301.
As an initial matter, the questioning was not specifically
aimed at Swink's possible drug and alcohol use while on the lam,
nor his mental state.

Pacheco does not testify to any questions

such as, "did you use any drugs?", "did you consume alcohol?",
"are you feeling suicidal?".

R.69[10-25].

Moreover, the State

did not establish that Pacheco's questions were prescribed by
statute or Decker Lake policy, or that they were otherwise
"normally attendant" to intake at Decker Lake.

Innis, 446 U.S.

at 301; see also State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 971-72 (Utah App.
1993) (holding that defendant was not interrogated where officer
asked questions prescribed by statute) (citing State v. Wilson,
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701 P.2d 1058, 1059 (Utah 1985) (same)); see also State v.
Dutchie. 969 P.2d 422, 426-27 (Utah 1988) (holding defendant was
not interrogated where one officer asked questions off department
questionnaire and where second officer asked name and age because
such questions were "normally attendant to arrest and custody and
were not likely to elicit an incriminating response").
Indeed, Pacheco's questions were uncharacteristic of an
intake interview to the extent that they focused on Swink's
general activity rather than his possible drug and alcohol use in
particular.

Pacheco testified that he generally "asked [Swink]

where he'd been, . . . what he was doing."

R.69[13].

Moreover,

Pacheco•s questioning in this regard was not "off-hand[ed]" nor
isolated.

Innis, 446 U.S. at 303 (holding that "few off-hand

remarks" made by police during "brief conversation" with
defendant were not likely to elicit incriminating response); see
also Singer, 815 P.2d at 1312 (few off-handed remarks regarding
officers' family sentiment did not amount to interrogation).
Rather, Pacheco's line of questioning continued for fortyfive minutes without a break, during which time he asked Swink at
least ten times about his activity in a calculated effort to get
the "whole story."

R.69[15].

Pacheco testified that he

intentionally persisted with this line of questioning because he
felt there were "inconsistencies and holes" in the story.

Id.

Pacheco and Ford should have known that such a calculated and
"lengthy harangue" as to Swink's activity was "likely to elicit
an incriminating response."

Innis, 446 U.S. at 303.
28
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Hence, the

trial court erred in concluding that the intake interview did not
amount to an "interrogation."

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; R.71[4].

The trial court's error is underscored given that both
Pacheco and Ford should have known that Swink was particularly
susceptible to Pacheco's questioning style.
at 3 02 n.8.

See Innis, 446 U.S.

Police knowledge of a suspect's "unusual

susceptibility . . .

to a particular form of persuasion might be

an important factor in determining whether [they] should have
known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response."

Id.

Pacheco's testimony indicates that he asked Swink at least
six times a general question about his whereabouts and activity.
R.69[13

("[i]nitially I just asked Brian where he'd been, you

know, what he was doing"); 14 ("[t]he conversation was, you know,
Brian, where have you been?

What have you been doing?"; "I'd

asked him where he'd been."; "I asked him, you know, Where have
you been?"); 15 ("each time I had asked him, a little bit more of
the story had come out"; "[o]nce again I said, Brian, there's
holes in the story.
going on.")].

You know, fill me in more of what's been

At the end of this series of questions, Swink

stated, "F it, . . . I'm going to get in trouble anyway."
R.69[15] .

Swink immediately proceeded to inform Pacheco and Ford

about the stolen van.

R.69[15-17].

Swink's statement was a verbalized indication to Pacheco and
Ford that he was about to divulge incriminating information as a
result of Pacheco's persistent and generalized questioning.
29
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It

is plain from Swink's choice of words (i.e., "I'm going to get in
trouble anyway"), R.69[15], that the next statement from Swink
would concern his criminal activity.

Given this clear,

verbalized indication that Swink was about to give incriminating
information, Pacheco and Ford were obliged to administer the
Miranda warnings.

See Innisf 446 U.S. at 301-02.

Their failure

to do so, R.69[25,34], renders Swink's statements inadmissible
and, consequently, the trial court's ruling as to interrogation
clearly erroneous.

R.71[4]; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.

To this end, the trial court's finding that Pacheco "didn't
have prior knowledge of the specific criminal activity" is an
unsound justification for its conclusion that Swink was not
"interrogated."

R.71[4].

Even if Pacheco did not have prior

knowledge of Swink's criminal, Pacheco was on alert at the point
that Swink stated, "F it. . . . I'm going to get in trouble
anyway."

R.69[15].

Such a statement is strongly suggestive of

guilt of something, if not the specific offense itself.
Accordingly, Pacheco and Ford were aware at that point that Swink
had been involved in some sort of criminal activity and was
willing to confess, necessitating Miranda warnings.

384 U.S. at

444.
Moreover, the trial court's finding is irrelevant to the
interrogation analysis.

It is the fact of the custodial

interrogation that necessitates Miranda warnings in the present
case.

As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court, " [i]t is the

compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and not the
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strength or content of the government's suspicions at the time
the questioning was conducted, which led the Court to impose the
Miranda requirements with regard to custodial questioning."
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47, 96 S.Ct. 1612,
48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976).
In addition to Swink's verbalized intent to divulge his
criminal conduct, Pacheco and Ford should have known that the
questioning would have "elicit[ed] an incriminating response" on
account of Swink's youth and the fact that he turned himself in
after absconding from Genesis.

Innis, 446 U.S. at 302.

time of the questioning, Swink was 17 years old.

At the

R.8 (booking

sheet indicating Swink's age); see, e.g.. Fare v. Michael C , 442
U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (considering
age of juvenile defendant in assessing voluntariness of waiver of
Miranda rights).

Swink's youth likely made him even more

susceptible to give incriminating answers in the face of
questioning by authority figures like Pacheco and Ford, a
counselor/youth corrections officer and police officer
respectively.

R.69 [10,21,26-27] . Moreover, although not

indicated in the record, Pacheco and Ford were undoubtedly older
than Swink, thus underscoring Swink's vulnerability to
questioning by adults.
The fact that Swink turned himself in to the authorities
also indicates a state-of-mind that should have led Pacheco and
Ford to understand that Swink would likely incriminate himself
during questioning.

See Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8.
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As opposed

to being arrested on the fugitive warrant against his will, Swink
turned himself in.

R.69[28].

Such an act is indicative of

Swink's remorse for running away and willingness to accept
responsibility for his behavior.

Under this guilty state-of-

mind, Pacheco and Ford should have understood that Swink would be
particularly susceptible to confessing his criminal behavior
while on the lam.

See Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8.

Other undisputed facts underscore the compulsion inherent in
the questioning of Swink and, therefore, render the trial court's
conclusion against interrogation clearly erroneous.

R.71[4].

For example, as noted supra Point I.A., the interview occurred in
a custodial setting.
occurred.

Swink was under arrest when the questioning

R.69[21, 34]. Moreover, "other objective indicia of

arrest" pervaded the atmosphere.

Swink was questioned at Decker

Lake, a secured correctional facility, by Pacheco, a counselor
and youth corrections officer, and in the presence of Ford, a
police officer.

Swink was also placed in Decker Lake issue

clothing and searched for weapons just prior to the interview.
Such circumstances constitute the sort of inherently
"incommunicado police-dominated atmosphere" that weakens a
suspect's will and subverts his right against self-incrimination.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456.
In addition, Pacheco's questions were permeated with his
articulated and unequivocal disbelief that Swink was not telling
the truth.

In fact, Pacheco used this doubt tactic as a tool to

get the "whole story."

R.69 [15]. The following colloquy
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evidences Pacheco's intent to employ this tactic in an effort to
elicit details from Swink, as well as his success in deriving the
desired information:
State: And his story is progressively changing.
does that mean to you?

What

Pacheco: Well, the inconsistencies and the holes, it
didn't make sense. The whole story was not there.
State: So what was your response to these holes and
inconsistencies (inaudible)?
Pacheco: Once again I said, Brian, there's holes in the
story. You know, fill me in more of what's been going
on.
State: And did he?
Pacheco: At one point, he did. He said F it. He said,
I'm going to get in trouble anyway. . . . I said, I
want to know the story from the time you left Genesis
to the time you were picked up, and he started from
that point.
R.69 [15] .
Pacheco got the hoped-for response because Swink, at this
point, admitted that he stole a vehicle and proceeded to give
details of the crime.

R.69[15-18],

Pacheco continued to express

doubt as to Swink's story in an effort to elicit more information
when he listed several vehicle brands in order to identify the
make and model of the vehicle that Swink stole.

R.69 [16] .

After

he ascertained that it was a mini-van, Pacheco once again told
Swink, "there's more to this story. . . . Let's hear the whole
story."

R.69 [17] . Again, Swink responded with more information,

explaining that he took "something" from South Towne Mall and
then fled in the van.

R.69[18].

In the face of such doubt and suspicion, especially when
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that doubt and suspicion are used as a tool to elicit more
information, a reasonable person in Swink's position would feel
compelled to answer the questions.

See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301

(focusing on "perceptions of the suspect").

In fact, as evinced

by the aforementioned testimony, Swink in fact gave incriminating
information.

Hence, the trial court erred as a matter of law

where the undisputed facts establish that Pacheco successfully
engaged in questioning deliberately designed to "elicit an
incriminating response."

Innis, 446 U.S. at 302; R.71[4].

As a final matter, the trial court erred in ruling that
Swink was not interrogated where the questions posed to Swink
directly related to the stolen vehicle and were, therefore, the
sort of "express questioning" mandating Miranda warnings.
446 U.S. at 300-01; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.

Innis,

Once

Swink admitted to stealing a vehicle, Pacheco asked direct
questions about the details of the crime.

For example, he asked

about the vehicle's make, R.69[16]; whether he "hot-wired it . .
. [or] ha[d] the keys," R.69[17]; where he drove the stolen
vehicle, R.69[17-18]; and where he abandoned it, R.69[19].
likewise asked direct questions about the stolen vehicle.

Ford
Ford

testified that it became clear that Swink stole a vehicle and
that he had left it running someplace.

R.69[30].

Accordingly,

Ford "asked [Swink] to describe . . . the exact location of the
vehicle so I could go and secure the vehicle."

Id.

As noted by the Innis Court, "Miranda safeguards come into
play whenever a person in custody is subjected to [] express
34
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questioning."

446 U.S. at 300-01.

As evidenced by the facts

marshalled above, Swink was subjected to express questioning
about the stolen van while in custody.

Accordingly, the trial

court erred in concluding that Swink was not subjected to the
sort of questioning necessitating the Miranda warnings.

R.71[4].

In sum, the trial court erred as a matter of law in
concluding that the undisputed facts do not establish
"interrogation" for purposes of Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
R.71 [3-4] .

The lengthy interview did not consist of simple

questions regarding Swink's possible drug or alcohol use.
Rather, Pacheco engaged in a persistent line of open-ended
questions calculated to elicit information as to Swink's activity
in general.

Moreover, although Pacheco and Ford were aware that

Swink was about to divulge incriminating information in response
to Pacheco's questions when he stated, "F it. . . . I'm going to
get in trouble anyway," they nonetheless failed to Mirandize
Swink.

Instead, Pacheco continued with the same line of

questioning, resulting in the sought-after information.
Moreover, both Pacheco and Ford asked direct questions about the
stolen vehicle once Swink admitted to that crime.
Hence, under the circumstances, Pacheco and Ford engaged in
"express questioning," as well as a line of questioning that they
should have known would "likely result in an incriminating
response."

Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02.

"undermine[d]

In so doing, they

[Swink's] privilege against self-incrimination"

since they failed to Mirandize him.

Innis, 446 U.S. at 299
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(citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58); R.69[25,34].
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Swink respectfully requests this
Court to reverse the trial court's order denying his motion to
suppress statements taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.

The undisputed facts establish

that Swink was subjected to a custodial interrogation.

The

undisputed facts likewise establish that he was not Mirandized at
any point during the custodial interrogation.

R.69[25,34].

Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law in
concluding that his statement was admissible under the Fifth
Amendment and Miranda, 3 84 U.S. at 444.
SUBMITTED this \L|fV^ day of February, 2000.

u^

CATHERINE E. LILLY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 991901631 FS

BRIAN SWINK,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

TYRONE E. MEDLEY
May 17, 1999

PRESENT
Clerk:
daleeng
Prosecutor: ESQUEDA, CARLOS A
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SHAPIRO, DAVID
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 13, 1981
Video
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/12/1999 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 991901631
Date:
May 17, 1999
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$250.00
$0.00
$212.50
$462.50

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Amount Due:

$250.00
$0
$212.50
$462.50

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $150.00
Pay in behalf of: LDA
Restitution:
Amount: $1400.00
Pay in behalf of: RESTITUTION
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 462.50 where the surcharge has been
added to the fine.
Pay fine to The Court.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol oi
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
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Case No: 991901631
Date:
May 17, 1999
Violate no laws.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Pay $1,400.00 restitution.
Interstate compact with the State of Iowa.
Standard gang clause imposed. Work hours have to be completed
before defendant goes to Iowa.
The Court orders the defendant to serve 180 days jail and receive
130 days credit for time served.
Dated this

17

day of

k

E. MEDLEY
ict Court Judi
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